聯準會主席柏南克見到了春生的新芽,總統歐巴馬說看到了「希望的曙光」,股市接連上演慶祝行情。
 

所以已經雨過天青、解除警報了嗎?這裡提出我們應該對經濟前景持審慎態度的4個理由。
 

一、經濟狀況仍在惡化。工業生產達十年來新低,新屋開工情況依舊疲軟。贖回權取消(法拍屋)在房貸業等待歐巴馬政府拯救房市計畫的細節時,數量一度減少,而今再度飆升。

我們頂多能說,零星的跡象顯示狀況惡化得比較慢,經濟狀況下墜不如以往劇烈,而且跡象還真「零星」。由聯準會定期調查工商產業狀況彙整而成、最新一期褐皮書指出,「本會所屬12個地區分行中,有5區經濟衰退速度已見緩和」。
 

二、部分好消息不具說服力。近來最大的正面消息來自銀行業,紛紛宣布好得驚人的獲利,但其中部分財報看起來有點…怪。 舉例來說,富國銀行日前宣布歷來單季最佳獲利,然而銀行財報不像銷售額,不是硬梆梆的數字。例如,銀行放款時預留多少準備金,以便填補未來可能的虧損,這 就與獲利大有關係。有些分析師也對富國的承受資產及其他會計項目表示相當懷疑。
 

同時,高盛宣布2008年第四季到2009年第一季,獲利大幅增加,但是分析師馬上注意到,高盛自個兒改變了「季」的定義(為了配合該公司法律狀態的改變)。所以—我可不是開玩笑的—對高盛來說表現很糟的12月,從財報獲利比較中消失了。
 

我不想在這裡深究這個問題。也許這些銀行真的在空前短的時間內,從鉅額虧損變為獲利滿盈,可是在這個馬多夫年代,會懷疑是很自然的。
 

至於那些期待財政部的「壓力測試」能讓事情一清二楚的人,白宮發言人吉布斯是這麼說的:「在這些壓力測試的部分結果中,各位將看到一份以系統及協調性的方式,判定及呈現銀行業全體的透明性報告。」不,我也不懂這句話的涵意。
 

三、可能還有些壞事會發生。即使在大蕭條時期,狀況都沒有一路直線下滑。特別是在經濟開始惡化一年半時,會有一段停頓期-差不多正是我們現在所處位置。但是接著大西洋兩岸傳出一連串銀行危機,再加上各國試圖保衛垂死的金本位制時,實施了一些糟糕的政策,全球經濟又跌下另一個懸崖。
 

這種情形會再度發生嗎?商用房地產繼續崩跌,信用卡虧損繼續增加,沒有人清楚日本或東歐的情況有多糟。我們或許不致於重演1931年的災難,但要說最壞的時局已經過去,可是八字還沒一撇。
 

四、就算到災難真的結束時,也不表示它已淫威盡失。2001年的經濟衰退,正式紀錄上只持續8個月,於11月結束,但失業問題仍持續了一年半。1990至1991年的經濟衰退也是一樣,我們絕對可以相信這次也不例外。假使失業率持續攀升直到2010年,亦毋須驚訝。
 

原因何在?只有當大量的潛在需求存在時,就業率方能止跌回升,這就是「V型復甦」。以1982年為例,房市被高利率壓垮時,聯準會介入調息後,房屋銷售量增加。現在不比當年,目前經濟蕭條,大體而言,我們累積太多負債,興建太多購物中心,但沒有人有花錢的興致。
 

就業率最終會回到原來水平,一向如此,但大概不會很快。
 

現在我搞得大家都很沮喪,所以答案到底是什麼?堅持到底。
 

歷史顯示,面對嚴峻的經濟衰退,過早的樂觀是政策上的一大危險。小羅斯福看到經濟復甦跡象時,應變方式是將工程進度管理署的規模砍半,以及增稅,結果大蕭條馬上全力反撲。日本在失去的10 年進行到一半時,鬆懈了原本的努力,以致經濟又停滯了5年之久。
 

這些道理歐巴馬政府的經濟學家都懂,他們也談到堅持現狀的所有好處,但有關新芽、曙光的種種說法,真有帶來自滿危機的風險。
 

因此,我給社會大眾和政策制訂者同樣的建議:經濟尚未真正復甦時,如意算盤別打得太早。 (作者Paul Krugman是紐約時報專欄作家/莊蕙嘉譯)


 

beagle2001 發表在 痞客邦 留言(0) 人氣()

※評析:

1. 聯準會在03/18/2009決策會議後的聲明中宣布,未來半年將購買3,000億美元的長期公債,同時將不動產抵押擔保證券的購買規模擴大7,500億美元,並且把向二大房貸機構房利美與房地美購買債券的規模擴大1倍至2,000億美元,總計對美國金融體系增加挹注1.2兆美元。部份市場人士擔心這將會使得美國對全球輸出通貨膨脹。我們認為就現階段的經濟條件來看,大可不必擔心通膨的問題。

2. 首先就過去fed就已經透過金融體系購買不動產抵押擔保債券與兩房的債券,如今只是將規模進一步的擴大。再者,就未來半年內將買回3000億美元的長天期公債,則可視為另一種的降息效果 — 如降息般的在金融體系內繼續注資。只因目前聯邦基金利率已降至接近0水位後已無再進一步的空間。

3. 至於通膨風險的壓力在現階段尚不至於產生,因目前全球經濟衰退的環境下,市場所擔心的重點是通縮的問題而非通膨的問題。從最近幾次fed的fomc會後聲明來看,fed所關心的議題正是經濟衰退風險。然而未來fed在開始實際購買長天期債券之後,顯示fed注資金融體系的態度更為積極後,貨幣量的擴增將對國際美元產生上漲的阻力。我們預期在金融市場不確定性的環境下仍將使得美元具備吸引力,但就長期來看,在fed量化寬鬆與財政赤字的擴大下,將使得美元長期走勢增添走跌的壓力。

beagle2001 發表在 痞客邦 留言(0) 人氣()

beagle2001 發表在 痞客邦 留言(0) 人氣()

2008-9-27 (088)

2008-9-27 (102)L

2008-9-26 (230)L

2008-9-26 (233)L

2008-9-26 (214)L

beagle2001 發表在 痞客邦 留言(0) 人氣()

What has Japan’s “lost decade” to teach us? Even a year ago, this seemed an absurd question. The general consensus of informed opinion was that the US, the UK and other heavily indebted western economies could not suffer as Japan had done. Now the question is changing to whether these countries will manage as well as Japan did. Welcome to the world of balance-sheet deflation.

As I have noted before, the best analysis of what happened to Japan is by Richard Koo of the Nomura Research Institute.* His big point, though simple, is ignored by conventional economics: balance sheets matter. Threatened with bankruptcy, the overborrowed will struggle to pay down their debts. A collapse in asset prices purchased through debt will have a far more devastating impact than the same collapse accompanied by little debt.

Most of the decline in Japanese private spending and borrowing in the 1990s was, argues Mr Koo, due not to the state of the banks, but to that of their borrowers. This was a situation in which, in the words of John Maynard Keynes, low interest rates – and Japan’s were, for years, as low as could be – were “pushing on a string”. Debtors kept paying down their loans.

How far, then, does this viewpoint inform us of the plight we are now in? A great deal, is the answer.

First, comparisons between today and the deep recessions of the early 1980s are utterly misguided. In 1981, US private debt was 123 per cent of gross domestic product; by the third quarter of 2008, it was 290 per cent. In 1981, household debt was 48 per cent of GDP; in 2007, it was 100 per cent. In 1980, the Federal Reserve’s intervention rate reached 19–20 per cent. Today, it is nearly zero.

When interest rates fell in the early 1980s, borrowing jumped (see chart below). The chances of igniting a surge in borrowing now are close to zero. A recession caused by the central bank’s determination to squeeze out inflation is quite different from one caused by excessive debt and collapsing net worth. In the former case, the central bank causes the recession. In the latter, it is trying hard to prevent it.

Second, those who argue that the Japanese government’s fiscal expansion failed are, again, mistaken. When the private sector tries to repay debt over many years, a country has three options: let the government do the borrowing; expand net exports; or let the economy collapse in a downward spiral of mass bankruptcy.

Despite a loss in wealth of three times GDP and a shift of 20 per cent of GDP in the financial balance of the corporate sector, from deficits into surpluses, Japan did not suffer a depression. This was a triumph. The explanation was the big fiscal deficits. When, in 1997, the Hashimoto government tried to reduce the fiscal deficits, the economy collapsed and actual fiscal deficits rose.

Third, recognising losses and recapitalising the financial system are vital, even if, as Mr Koo argues, the unwillingness to borrow was even more important. The Japanese lived with zombie banks for nearly a decade. The explanation was a political stand-off: public hostility to bankers rendered it impossible to inject government money on a large scale, and the power of bankers made it impossible to nationalise insolvent institutions. For years, people pretended that the problem was downward overshooting of asset price. In the end, a financial implosion forced the Japanese government’s hand. The same was true in the US last autumn, but the opportunity for a full restructuring and recapitalisation of the system was lost.

In the US, the state of the financial sector may well be far more important than it was in Japan. The big US debt accumulations were not by non-financial corporations but by households and the financial sector. The gross debt of the financial sector rose from 22 per cent of GDP in 1981 to 117 per cent in the third quarter of 2008, while the debt of non-financial corporations rose only from 53 per cent to 76 per cent of GDP. Thus, the desire of financial institutions to shrink balance sheets may be an even bigger cause of recession in the US.

How far, then, is Japan’s overall experience relevant to today?

The good news is that the asset price bubbles themselves were far smaller in the US than in Japan (see charts below). Furthermore, the US central bank has been swifter in recognising reality, cutting interest rates quickly to close to zero and moving towards “unconventional” monetary policy.

The bad news is that the debate over fiscal policy in the US seems even more neanderthal than in Japan: it cannot be stressed too strongly that in a balance-sheet deflation, with zero official interest rates, fiscal policy is all we have. The big danger is that an attempt will be made to close the fiscal deficit prematurely, with dire results. Again, the US administration’s proposals for a public/private partnership , to purchase toxic assets, look hopeless. Even if it can be made to work operationally, the prices are likely to be too low to encourage banks to sell or to represent a big taxpayer subsidy to buyers, sellers, or both. Far more important, it is unlikely that modestly raising prices of a range of bad assets will recapitalise damaged institutions. In the end, reality will come out. But that may follow a lengthy pretence.

Yet what is happening inside the US is far from the worst news. That is the global reach of the crisis. Japan was able to rely on exports to a buoyant world economy. This crisis is global: the bubbles and associated spending booms spread across much of the western world, as did the financial mania and purchases of bad assets. Economies directly affected account for close to half of the world economy. Economies indirectly affected, via falling external demand and collapsing finance, account for the rest. The US, it is clear, remains the core of the world economy.

As a result, we confront a balance-sheet deflation that, albeit far shallower than that in Japan in the 1990s, has a far wider reach. It is, for this reason, fanciful to imagine a swift and strong return to global growth. Where is the demand to come from? From over-indebted western consumers? Hardly. From emerging country consumers? Unlikely. From fiscal expansion? Up to a point. But this still looks too weak and too unbalanced, with much coming from the US. China is helping, but the eurozone and Japan seem paralysed, while most emerging economies cannot now risk aggressive action.

Last year marked the end of a hopeful era. Today, it is impossible to rule out a lost decade for the world economy. This has to be prevented. Posterity will not forgive leaders who fail to rise to this great challenge.

* The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics (John Wiley, 2008)

beagle2001 發表在 痞客邦 留言(0) 人氣()