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曾愷玹.宿遊京都

曾愷玹有正到
這本買定(看照片)
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「HERO」這個名字實在太威啦~也讓我想到木村以前的日劇 XD~
Android給我很大的期待,不只又是Google帶來的禮物和驚喜,主要是Android承諾的全面開放,真的讓人有無比的想像空間。


SmartPhone的低價化,注定從雲端來到人間,未來也不是高不可攀,

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The recession tracks the Great Depression
By Martin Wolf
Published: June 16 2009 19:41 | Last updated: June 16 2009 19:41


Green shoots are bursting out. Or so we are told. But before concluding that the recession will soon be over, we must ask what history tells us. It is one of the guides we have to our present predicament. Fortunately, we do have the data. Unfortunately, the story they tell is an unhappy one.


Two economic historians, Barry Eichengreen of the University of California at Berkeley and Kevin O’Rourke of Trinity College, Dublin, have provided pictures worth more than a thousand words (see charts).* In their paper, Profs Eichengreen and O’Rourke date the beginning of the current global recession to April 2008 and that of the Great Depression to June 1929. So what are their conclusions on where we are a little over a year into the recession? The bad news is that this recession fully matches the early part of the Great Depression. The good news is that the worst can still be averted.

First, global industrial output tracks the decline in industrial output during the Great Depression horrifyingly closely. Within Europe, the decline in the industrial output of France and Italy has been worse than at this point in the 1930s, while that of the UK and Germany is much the same. The declines in the US and Canada are also close to those in the 1930s. But Japan’s industrial collapse has been far worse than in the 1930s, despite a very recent recovery.

Second, the collapse in the volume of world trade has been far worse than during the first year of the Great Depression. Indeed, the decline in world trade in the first year is equal to that in the first two years of the Great Depression. This is not because of protection, but because of collapsing demand for manufactures.

Third, despite the recent bounce, the decline in world stock markets is far bigger than in the corresponding period of the Great Depression.

The two authors sum up starkly: “Globally we are tracking or doing even worse than the Great Depression ... This is a Depression-sized event.”

Yet what gave the Great Depression its name was a brutal decline over three years. This time the world is applying the lessons taken from that event by John Maynard Keynes and Milton Friedman, the two most influential economists of the 20th century. The policy response suggests that the disaster will not be repeated.

Profs Eichengreen and O’Rourke describe this contrast. During the Great Depression, the weighted average discount rate of the seven leading economies never fell below 3 per cent. Today it is close to zero. Even the European Central Bank, most hawkish of the big central banks, has lowered its rate to 1 per cent. Again, during the Great Depression, money supply collapsed. But this time it has continued to rise. Indeed, the combination of strong monetary growth with deep recession raises doubts about the monetarist explanation for the Great Depression. Finally, fiscal policy has been far more aggressive this time. In the early 1930s the weighted average deficit for 24 significant countries remained smaller than 4 per cent of gross domestic product. Today, fiscal deficits will be far higher. In the US, the general government deficit is expected to be almost 14 per cent of GDP.

All this is consistent with the conclusions of an already classic paper by Carmen Reinhart of the university of Maryland and Kenneth Rogoff of Harvard.** Financial crises cause deep economic crises. The impact of a global financial crisis should be particularly severe. Moreover, “the real value of government debt tends to explode, rising an average of 86 per cent in the major post–World War II episodes”. The chief reason is not the “bail-outs” of banks but the recessions. After the fact, runaway private lending turns into public spending and mountains of debt. Creditworthy governments will not accept the alternative of a big slump.

The question is whether today’s unprecedented stimulus will offset the effect of financial collapse and unprecedented accumulations of private sector debt in the US and elsewhere. If the former wins, we will soon see a positive deviation from the path of the Great Depression. If the latter wins, we will not. What everybody hopes is clear. But what should we expect?

We are seeing a race between the repair of private balance sheets and global rebalancing of demand, on the one hand, and the sustainability of stimulus, on the other.



Robust private sector demand will return only once the balance sheets of over-indebted households, overborrowed businesses and undercapitalised financial sectors are repaired or when countries with high savings rates consume or invest more. None of this is likely to be quick. Indeed, it is far more likely to take years, given the extraordinary debt accumulations of the past decade. Over the past two quarters, for example, US households repaid just 3.1 per cent of their debt. Deleveraging is a lengthy process. Meanwhile, the federal government has become the only significant borrower. Similarly, the Chinese government can swiftly expand investment. But it is harder for policy to raise levels of consumption.

The great likelihood is that the world economy will need aggressive monetary and fiscal policies far longer than many believe. That is going to be make policymakers – and investors – nervous.

Two opposing dangers arise. One is that the stimulus is withdrawn too soon, as happened in the 1930s and in Japan in the late 1990s. There will then be a relapse into recession, because the private sector is still unable, or unwilling, to spend. The other danger is that stimulus is withdrawn too late. That would lead to a loss of confidence in monetary stability worsened by concerns over the sustainability of public debt, particularly in the US, the provider of the world’s key currency. At the limit, soaring dollar prices of commodities and rising long-term interest rates on government bonds might put the US – and world economies – into a malign stagflation. Contrary to some alarmists, I see no signs of such a panic today. But it might happen.

Last year the world economy tipped over into a slump. The policy response has been massive. But those sure we are at the beginning of a robust private sector-led recovery are almost certainly deluded. The race to full recovery is likely to be long, hard and uncertain.

martin.wolf@ft.com
More columns at www.ft.com/martinwolf

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1008ha_01 Asus Eee PC 1008HA Sea Shell

 

Netbook候選人的名單又多了一名。

又回到本宗始祖Asus了(畢竟他股票讓我有機會賺了近50%,可惜壓超少)

超薄、圓弧型的造型是吸引我最重要的一點,因為好帶,隨身攜帶方便,對我來說netbook的效能不用多好,只是隨身的戰鬥機而已,或是旅行用打稿的機器而已。所以看順眼最重要。

比較care的還是覺得他的logo「Eee」有點醜,其實也只是個人觀點不同而已(其實網路上有同感的人也蠻多的),不過大不了就用貼紙蓋過去就好了。

可惜的還是2357真的壓超少,「底部進場、不贏也難」啊~

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聯準會主席柏南克見到了春生的新芽,總統歐巴馬說看到了「希望的曙光」,股市接連上演慶祝行情。
 

所以已經雨過天青、解除警報了嗎?這裡提出我們應該對經濟前景持審慎態度的4個理由。
 

一、經濟狀況仍在惡化。工業生產達十年來新低,新屋開工情況依舊疲軟。贖回權取消(法拍屋)在房貸業等待歐巴馬政府拯救房市計畫的細節時,數量一度減少,而今再度飆升。

我們頂多能說,零星的跡象顯示狀況惡化得比較慢,經濟狀況下墜不如以往劇烈,而且跡象還真「零星」。由聯準會定期調查工商產業狀況彙整而成、最新一期褐皮書指出,「本會所屬12個地區分行中,有5區經濟衰退速度已見緩和」。
 

二、部分好消息不具說服力。近來最大的正面消息來自銀行業,紛紛宣布好得驚人的獲利,但其中部分財報看起來有點…怪。 舉例來說,富國銀行日前宣布歷來單季最佳獲利,然而銀行財報不像銷售額,不是硬梆梆的數字。例如,銀行放款時預留多少準備金,以便填補未來可能的虧損,這 就與獲利大有關係。有些分析師也對富國的承受資產及其他會計項目表示相當懷疑。
 

同時,高盛宣布2008年第四季到2009年第一季,獲利大幅增加,但是分析師馬上注意到,高盛自個兒改變了「季」的定義(為了配合該公司法律狀態的改變)。所以—我可不是開玩笑的—對高盛來說表現很糟的12月,從財報獲利比較中消失了。
 

我不想在這裡深究這個問題。也許這些銀行真的在空前短的時間內,從鉅額虧損變為獲利滿盈,可是在這個馬多夫年代,會懷疑是很自然的。
 

至於那些期待財政部的「壓力測試」能讓事情一清二楚的人,白宮發言人吉布斯是這麼說的:「在這些壓力測試的部分結果中,各位將看到一份以系統及協調性的方式,判定及呈現銀行業全體的透明性報告。」不,我也不懂這句話的涵意。
 

三、可能還有些壞事會發生。即使在大蕭條時期,狀況都沒有一路直線下滑。特別是在經濟開始惡化一年半時,會有一段停頓期-差不多正是我們現在所處位置。但是接著大西洋兩岸傳出一連串銀行危機,再加上各國試圖保衛垂死的金本位制時,實施了一些糟糕的政策,全球經濟又跌下另一個懸崖。
 

這種情形會再度發生嗎?商用房地產繼續崩跌,信用卡虧損繼續增加,沒有人清楚日本或東歐的情況有多糟。我們或許不致於重演1931年的災難,但要說最壞的時局已經過去,可是八字還沒一撇。
 

四、就算到災難真的結束時,也不表示它已淫威盡失。2001年的經濟衰退,正式紀錄上只持續8個月,於11月結束,但失業問題仍持續了一年半。1990至1991年的經濟衰退也是一樣,我們絕對可以相信這次也不例外。假使失業率持續攀升直到2010年,亦毋須驚訝。
 

原因何在?只有當大量的潛在需求存在時,就業率方能止跌回升,這就是「V型復甦」。以1982年為例,房市被高利率壓垮時,聯準會介入調息後,房屋銷售量增加。現在不比當年,目前經濟蕭條,大體而言,我們累積太多負債,興建太多購物中心,但沒有人有花錢的興致。
 

就業率最終會回到原來水平,一向如此,但大概不會很快。
 

現在我搞得大家都很沮喪,所以答案到底是什麼?堅持到底。
 

歷史顯示,面對嚴峻的經濟衰退,過早的樂觀是政策上的一大危險。小羅斯福看到經濟復甦跡象時,應變方式是將工程進度管理署的規模砍半,以及增稅,結果大蕭條馬上全力反撲。日本在失去的10 年進行到一半時,鬆懈了原本的努力,以致經濟又停滯了5年之久。
 

這些道理歐巴馬政府的經濟學家都懂,他們也談到堅持現狀的所有好處,但有關新芽、曙光的種種說法,真有帶來自滿危機的風險。
 

因此,我給社會大眾和政策制訂者同樣的建議:經濟尚未真正復甦時,如意算盤別打得太早。 (作者Paul Krugman是紐約時報專欄作家/莊蕙嘉譯)


 

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※評析:

1. 聯準會在03/18/2009決策會議後的聲明中宣布,未來半年將購買3,000億美元的長期公債,同時將不動產抵押擔保證券的購買規模擴大7,500億美元,並且把向二大房貸機構房利美與房地美購買債券的規模擴大1倍至2,000億美元,總計對美國金融體系增加挹注1.2兆美元。部份市場人士擔心這將會使得美國對全球輸出通貨膨脹。我們認為就現階段的經濟條件來看,大可不必擔心通膨的問題。

2. 首先就過去fed就已經透過金融體系購買不動產抵押擔保債券與兩房的債券,如今只是將規模進一步的擴大。再者,就未來半年內將買回3000億美元的長天期公債,則可視為另一種的降息效果 — 如降息般的在金融體系內繼續注資。只因目前聯邦基金利率已降至接近0水位後已無再進一步的空間。

3. 至於通膨風險的壓力在現階段尚不至於產生,因目前全球經濟衰退的環境下,市場所擔心的重點是通縮的問題而非通膨的問題。從最近幾次fed的fomc會後聲明來看,fed所關心的議題正是經濟衰退風險。然而未來fed在開始實際購買長天期債券之後,顯示fed注資金融體系的態度更為積極後,貨幣量的擴增將對國際美元產生上漲的阻力。我們預期在金融市場不確定性的環境下仍將使得美元具備吸引力,但就長期來看,在fed量化寬鬆與財政赤字的擴大下,將使得美元長期走勢增添走跌的壓力。

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What has Japan’s “lost decade” to teach us? Even a year ago, this seemed an absurd question. The general consensus of informed opinion was that the US, the UK and other heavily indebted western economies could not suffer as Japan had done. Now the question is changing to whether these countries will manage as well as Japan did. Welcome to the world of balance-sheet deflation.

As I have noted before, the best analysis of what happened to Japan is by Richard Koo of the Nomura Research Institute.* His big point, though simple, is ignored by conventional economics: balance sheets matter. Threatened with bankruptcy, the overborrowed will struggle to pay down their debts. A collapse in asset prices purchased through debt will have a far more devastating impact than the same collapse accompanied by little debt.

Most of the decline in Japanese private spending and borrowing in the 1990s was, argues Mr Koo, due not to the state of the banks, but to that of their borrowers. This was a situation in which, in the words of John Maynard Keynes, low interest rates – and Japan’s were, for years, as low as could be – were “pushing on a string”. Debtors kept paying down their loans.

How far, then, does this viewpoint inform us of the plight we are now in? A great deal, is the answer.

First, comparisons between today and the deep recessions of the early 1980s are utterly misguided. In 1981, US private debt was 123 per cent of gross domestic product; by the third quarter of 2008, it was 290 per cent. In 1981, household debt was 48 per cent of GDP; in 2007, it was 100 per cent. In 1980, the Federal Reserve’s intervention rate reached 19–20 per cent. Today, it is nearly zero.

When interest rates fell in the early 1980s, borrowing jumped (see chart below). The chances of igniting a surge in borrowing now are close to zero. A recession caused by the central bank’s determination to squeeze out inflation is quite different from one caused by excessive debt and collapsing net worth. In the former case, the central bank causes the recession. In the latter, it is trying hard to prevent it.

Second, those who argue that the Japanese government’s fiscal expansion failed are, again, mistaken. When the private sector tries to repay debt over many years, a country has three options: let the government do the borrowing; expand net exports; or let the economy collapse in a downward spiral of mass bankruptcy.

Despite a loss in wealth of three times GDP and a shift of 20 per cent of GDP in the financial balance of the corporate sector, from deficits into surpluses, Japan did not suffer a depression. This was a triumph. The explanation was the big fiscal deficits. When, in 1997, the Hashimoto government tried to reduce the fiscal deficits, the economy collapsed and actual fiscal deficits rose.

Third, recognising losses and recapitalising the financial system are vital, even if, as Mr Koo argues, the unwillingness to borrow was even more important. The Japanese lived with zombie banks for nearly a decade. The explanation was a political stand-off: public hostility to bankers rendered it impossible to inject government money on a large scale, and the power of bankers made it impossible to nationalise insolvent institutions. For years, people pretended that the problem was downward overshooting of asset price. In the end, a financial implosion forced the Japanese government’s hand. The same was true in the US last autumn, but the opportunity for a full restructuring and recapitalisation of the system was lost.

In the US, the state of the financial sector may well be far more important than it was in Japan. The big US debt accumulations were not by non-financial corporations but by households and the financial sector. The gross debt of the financial sector rose from 22 per cent of GDP in 1981 to 117 per cent in the third quarter of 2008, while the debt of non-financial corporations rose only from 53 per cent to 76 per cent of GDP. Thus, the desire of financial institutions to shrink balance sheets may be an even bigger cause of recession in the US.

How far, then, is Japan’s overall experience relevant to today?

The good news is that the asset price bubbles themselves were far smaller in the US than in Japan (see charts below). Furthermore, the US central bank has been swifter in recognising reality, cutting interest rates quickly to close to zero and moving towards “unconventional” monetary policy.

The bad news is that the debate over fiscal policy in the US seems even more neanderthal than in Japan: it cannot be stressed too strongly that in a balance-sheet deflation, with zero official interest rates, fiscal policy is all we have. The big danger is that an attempt will be made to close the fiscal deficit prematurely, with dire results. Again, the US administration’s proposals for a public/private partnership , to purchase toxic assets, look hopeless. Even if it can be made to work operationally, the prices are likely to be too low to encourage banks to sell or to represent a big taxpayer subsidy to buyers, sellers, or both. Far more important, it is unlikely that modestly raising prices of a range of bad assets will recapitalise damaged institutions. In the end, reality will come out. But that may follow a lengthy pretence.

Yet what is happening inside the US is far from the worst news. That is the global reach of the crisis. Japan was able to rely on exports to a buoyant world economy. This crisis is global: the bubbles and associated spending booms spread across much of the western world, as did the financial mania and purchases of bad assets. Economies directly affected account for close to half of the world economy. Economies indirectly affected, via falling external demand and collapsing finance, account for the rest. The US, it is clear, remains the core of the world economy.

As a result, we confront a balance-sheet deflation that, albeit far shallower than that in Japan in the 1990s, has a far wider reach. It is, for this reason, fanciful to imagine a swift and strong return to global growth. Where is the demand to come from? From over-indebted western consumers? Hardly. From emerging country consumers? Unlikely. From fiscal expansion? Up to a point. But this still looks too weak and too unbalanced, with much coming from the US. China is helping, but the eurozone and Japan seem paralysed, while most emerging economies cannot now risk aggressive action.

Last year marked the end of a hopeful era. Today, it is impossible to rule out a lost decade for the world economy. This has to be prevented. Posterity will not forgive leaders who fail to rise to this great challenge.

* The Holy Grail of Macroeconomics (John Wiley, 2008)

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Has Barack Obama’s presidency already failed? In normal times, this would be a ludicrous question. But these are not normal times. They are times of great danger. Today, the new US administration can disown responsibility for its inheritance; tomorrow, it will own it. Today, it can offer solutions; tomorrow it will have become the problem. Today, it is in control of events; tomorrow, events will take control of it. Doing too little is now far riskier than doing too much. If he fails to act decisively, the president risks being overwhelmed, like his predecessor. The costs to the US and the world of another failed presidency do not bear contemplating.

What is needed? The answer is: focus and ferocity. If Mr Obama does not fix this crisis, all he hopes from his presidency will be lost. If he does, he can reshape the agenda. Hoping for the best is foolish. He should expect the worst and act accordingly.

Yet hoping for the best is what one sees in the stimulus programme and – so far as I can judge from Tuesday’s sketchy announcement by Tim Geithner, Treasury secretary – also in the new plans for fixing the banking system. I commented on the former last week. I would merely add that it is extraordinary that a popular new president, confronting a once-in-80-years’ economic crisis, has let Congress shape the outcome.

The banking programme seems to be yet another child of the failed interventions of the past one and a half years: optimistic and indecisive. If this “progeny of the troubled asset relief programme” fails, Mr Obama’s credibility will be ruined. Now is the time for action that seems close to certain to resolve the problem; this, however, does not seem to be it.

All along two contrasting views have been held on what ails the financial system. The first is that this is essentially a panic. The second is that this is a problem of insolvency.

Under the first view, the prices of a defined set of “toxic assets” have been driven below their long-run value and in some cases have become impossible to sell. The solution, many suggest, is for governments to make a market, buy assets or insure banks against losses. This was the rationale for the original Tarp and the “super-SIV (special investment vehicle)” proposed by Henry (Hank) Paulson, the previous Treasury secretary, in 2007.

Under the second view, a sizeable proportion of financial institutions are insolvent: their assets are, under plausible assumptions, worth less than their liabilities. The International Monetary Fund argues that potential losses on US-originated credit assets alone are now $2,200bn (€1,700bn, £1,500bn), up from $1,400bn just last October. This is almost identical to the latest estimates from Goldman Sachs. In recent comments to the Financial Times, Nouriel Roubini of RGE Monitor and the Stern School of New York University estimates peak losses on US-generated assets at $3,600bn. Fortunately for the US, half of these losses will fall abroad. But, the rest of the world will strike back: as the world economy implodes, huge losses abroad – on sovereign, housing and corporate debt – will surely fall on US institutions, with dire effects.

Personally, I have little doubt that the second view is correct and, as the world economy deteriorates, will become ever more so. But this is not the heart of the matter. That is whether, in the presence of such uncertainty, it can be right to base policy on hoping for the best. The answer is clear: rational policymakers must assume the worst. If this proved pessimistic, they would end up with an over-capitalised financial system. If the optimistic choice turned out to be wrong, they would have zombie banks and a discredited government. This choice is surely a “no brainer”.

The new plan seems to make sense if and only if the principal problem is illiquidity. Offering guarantees and buying some portion of the toxic assets, while limiting new capital injections to less than the $350bn left in the Tarp, cannot deal with the insolvency problem identified by informed observers. Indeed, any toxic asset purchase or guarantee programme must be an ineffective, inefficient and inequitable way to rescue inadequately capitalised financial institutions: ineffective, because the government must buy vast amounts of doubtful assets at excessive prices or provide over-generous guarantees, to render insolvent banks solvent; inefficient, because big capital injections or conversion of debt into equity are better ways to recapitalise banks; and inequitable, because big subsidies would go to failed institutions and private buyers of bad assets.

Why then is the administration making what appears to be a blunder? It may be that it is hoping for the best. But it also seems it has set itself the wrong question. It has not asked what needs to be done to be sure of a solution. It has asked itself, instead, what is the best it can do given three arbitrary, self-imposed constraints: no nationalisation; no losses for bondholders; and no more money from Congress. Yet why does a new administration, confronting a huge crisis, not try to change the terms of debate? This timidity is depressing. Trying to make up for this mistake by imposing pettifogging conditions on assisted institutions is more likely to compound the error than to reduce it.

Assume that the problem is insolvency and the modest market value of US commercial banks (about $400bn) derives from government support (see charts). Assume, too, that it is impossible to raise large amounts of private capital today. Then there has to be recapitalisation in one of the two ways indicated above. Both have disadvantages: government recapitalisation is a bail-out of creditors and involves temporary state administration; debt-for-equity swaps would damage bond markets, insurance companies and pension funds. But the choice is inescapable.

If Mr Geithner or Lawrence Summers, head of the national economic council, were advising the US as a foreign country, they would point this out, brutally. Dominique Strauss-Kahn, IMF managing director, said the same thing, very gently, in Malaysia last Saturday.

The correct advice remains the one the US gave the Japanese and others during the 1990s: admit reality, restructure banks and, above all, slay zombie institutions at once. It is an important, but secondary, question whether the right answer is to create new “good banks”, leaving old bad banks to perish, as my colleague, Willem Buiter, recommends, or new “bad banks”, leaving cleansed old banks to survive. I also am inclined to the former, because the culture of the old banks seems so toxic.

By asking the wrong question, Mr Obama is taking a huge gamble. He should have resolved to cleanse these Augean banking stables. He needs to rethink, if it is not already too late.

 

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綠燈俠 (Green Lantern) 真可謂空軍吉祥物是也!

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這個超炫的秀圖程式雖然說以前已經用過了,而且當時就覺得他的3D 秀圖炫到爆!不過現在又多了一個full-screen slideshow mode,讓我更是愛不釋手,原本就是希望先前的版本有這個東西(或者是本來就有了,我傻傻不知),現在有真是太棒,不多說,用過就知道,IE和Fx都有,IE不知要更新到幾版的,比較推薦用Fx就是。


PicLens
www.piclens.com/

View and navigate images and YouTube videos on the "3D Wall" Enjoy media in full-screen slideshow mode
Search YouTube, Flickr, Google Images, Facebook, and more
Jump to the corresponding webpage of an image or video

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  • Jul 21 Sat 2007 22:50
  • 721

 

 

 

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1.

小恶魔教材, originally uploaded by Appleping (?).
2.
好象突然想起来什么, originally uploaded by Appleping (?).
3.
小恶魔出现了, originally uploaded by Appleping (?).

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